Remnant threat model
Last updated 2 November 2026.
Remnant has had no independent security audit. This page says what it is built to resist, what it does not resist, and what is still open. Read it before relying on Remnant where a failure would cost you.
What Remnant is for
Reaching one person or organisation you have chosen, privately, when the network, a government or a platform is working against you. Messages, files and Bitcoin payments travel over Tor and I2P, between people who added each other.
Who it is built to resist
| Adversary | What Remnant does |
|---|---|
| Someone reading your traffic on a network (an ISP, a café, a mobile carrier) | Everything leaves the phone over Tor or I2P. There are no direct connections to Bitcoin peers, websites or price services. They see that you use Tor or I2P, not who you talk to or what you say. |
| A network that blocks Tor or I2P | If one is blocked, Remnant carries its traffic over the other. Bluetooth and NFC work with no internet at all, over short range. |
| A server operator or relay | There is no Remnant server holding your messages or contacts. Messages are encrypted for the recipient (NIP-44) and signed by the sender, so a relay in the path cannot read or alter them. |
| A stranger who finds your address | Remnant does not list or publish users. You only learn a contact by meeting in person (an NFC tap or Bluetooth), so your Tor and I2P addresses are not public. An organisation can be reached only if it is registered and in the app's list, and it approves each connection request. |
| Someone who tampers with a registered organisation | Each organisation's file is signed, and the app refuses an organisation whose signatures do not check. |
| Someone who takes the phone while it is locked | The app needs a PIN (4 to 8 digits) to open and locks out after wrong guesses. Its data is encrypted with a hardware-backed key, and backups are off. |
| Details hidden in files you send | Photos, video and common documents can have location, device and author details removed before sending. You choose per file; nothing is removed or kept silently. |
| A malicious file | Received files are stored encrypted and are never opened for you. A photo is drawn inside the app; anything else is saved only where you choose. |
What it does not protect against
- A seized, unlocked phone, or one taken with the PIN. There is no panic wipe, decoy PIN or disappearing messages yet. If your phone can be taken from you, assume what is on it can be read.
- A compromised phone. Malware, a hostile operating system or someone with root can read the screen and the keys. Remnant cannot fix a phone it does not control.
- A global adversary watching both ends. Tor and I2P do not stop an observer who sees traffic entering and leaving the network at the right moments. Remnant does not yet add random delays to hide timing.
- Knowing that you use Remnant. Tor and I2P traffic is recognisable as such. The app is not disguised.
- Someone you add being untrustworthy. A contact can screenshot or forward what you send. Remnant authenticates who you are talking to; it cannot make them discreet.
- A mistake in what you send. If you choose to keep a file's details, they go. Names inside a document, a face in a photo or a distinctive writing style still identify you.
- A compromised organisation. If the organisation you write to is breached or coerced, what you sent them is exposed.
- Stolen long-term keys. Forward secrecy and post-compromise security are not built yet, so earlier messages an attacker has kept could be read if a key is stolen.
- Bugs. No independent party has reviewed the code. Builds are not yet reproducible, so you cannot verify that the app matches the source.
Trust you are asked to give
- Resolving Architecture approves each organisation on the list (an approver on an admin build, working with the organisation's security officer) and publishes the app. A compromised publisher could ship a bad build. This is why reproducible builds and an audit matter.
- Your contacts and the organisation you write to.
- Tor and I2P, to work as designed.
- Your phone's hardware and operating system.
Who should not rely on Remnant yet
If an exposed message could put your life, liberty or livelihood at risk, and your phone could be taken from you, do not rely on Remnant alone. For Bitcoin, start with small amounts.
Roadmap against these gaps
No dates. The order follows the people we serve first: whistleblowing and journalism, then frozen savings.
| Gap | Planned fix | Stage |
|---|---|---|
| Seized phone | Panic wipe, decoy PIN, disappearing messages | Next |
| Knowing you use Remnant | Disguised app and transports that look like ordinary traffic | Next |
| Losing the phone loses everything | Restore from the 12 words and contacts' backups | Next |
| One person is a single point of failure for an organisation | Group chat for a team | After the first pilot |
| Timing observers | Random delays in routing | After the first pilot |
| Stolen long-term keys | Forward secrecy, then post-compromise security | After the first pilot |
| Cannot verify the app matches the source | Reproducible builds | Needs funding |
| Bugs no one independent has looked for | Independent security audit | Needs funding |
| Compromised publisher | Reproducible builds and the audit above; more than one signer on the organisation list | Needs funding |
“Needs funding” means the work waits until Remnant brings in enough to pay for it. We will say so here when each item is done, and not before.
Questions or something we got wrong? See contact.